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Although many responses to odorous stimuli are mediated without olfactory information
being consciously processed, some olfactory behaviors require conscious information
processing. I will here contrast situations in which olfactory information is processed
consciously to situations in which it is processed non-consciously.This contrastive analysis
reveals that conscious information processing is required when an organism is faced with
tasks in which there are many behavioral options available. I therefore propose that it is the
evolutionary function of conscious information processing to guide behaviors in situations
in which the organism has to choose between many possible responses.
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Brains continuously process information. Sometimes this infor-
mation processing is conscious, which means that there is some-
thing it is like for the organism to process the information, to borrow
an expression from the philosopher Thomas Nagel (1974). In con-
trast, most information is processed non-consciously and there
is nothing it is like for the organism to process the informa-
tion, just like there is nothing it is like for the organism to ﬁlter
blood in the kidney. In this paper I will contrast conscious and
non-conscious processes in the olfactory system to identify the
evolutionary function of conscious information processing.
The approach presented here differs in two important aspects
fromsimilar approaches. First, this is not an analysis of the function
of consciousness but of the function of conscious information process-
ing. Conscious information processing is the subset of information
processing that is accompanied by consciousness. An analogy can
illustrate the importance of this seemingly subtle difference. The
central nervous system can be divided into gray matter and white
matter. One can speculate about the function of the “grayness”
of gray matter, or one can investigate the function of gray matter
without discussing the function of its “grayness.” The approach
presented here is analogous to the second option. This means that
whatever conclusion will be reached, it is consistent with con-
sciousness having no function at all (Flanagan, 1997). A second
important feature of the approach presented here is that I am
interested in the evolutionary function of conscious information
processing, whereas discussions of the function of consciousness
often focus on the current uses of consciousness. To illustrate the
importance of the distinction between evolutionary function and
current uses, let’s consider wings. The evolutionary function of
wings is ﬂight. However, wings have many different current uses.
Bees use wings to communicate. Some birds protect their young
by taking them under their wings. Butterﬂies have patterns on
their wings to scare or confuse predators. Male ostriches and birds
of paradise use their wings during courtship displays and cranes
use their wings to shade the water surface to better see their prey
swimming underneath (Gazzaniga et al., 2009, p. 651).
I believe that the analysis of the evolutionary function of con-
scious information processing presented in this paper will provide
an interesting contrast to the literature on the current uses of
consciousness. My analysis will be presented in biological terms
because determining evolutionary functions of evolved mecha-
nisms is a common strategy in biology where “mechanism” and
“evolution” are central concepts. I will introduce the strategy of
determining evolutionary function through contrastive analysis in
the ﬁrst section of the paper. In the second section I will apply this
strategy to conscious information processing in the olfactory sys-
tem. The result of this analysis is that it is the function of conscious
information processing in the olfactory system to guide behaviors
in situations in which an organism is faced with tasks in which
there are many different behavioral options to chose from. In the
third section I will argue that many apparently competing propos-
als describe the processes in the brain at a different level and are
therefore consistent with the results presented here. In the fourth
section I will sketch how the task-dependency of conscious infor-
mation processing relates to more general observations outside of
the olfactory system.
CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTION
The evolutionary function of a biological mechanism is deter-
mined by its evolutionary history. At some point during our
evolutionary history, an organism appeared that had the capac-
ity to process information consciously in a certain brain structure.
This capacity was inheritable, which means that the organism’s
offspring also had the capacity. In addition, the organism with
the capacity for conscious information processing had an adap-
tive advantage over organisms without this capacity. Conscious
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information processors therefore had more offspring (on average
over time) than other organisms of the same species. If a capacity
is heritable and results in an increased number of offspring, it will
be selected for through evolution by natural selection (Lewon-
tin, 1985). To identify the evolutionary function of conscious
information processing, one has to identify the reason why the
ﬁrst conscious information processor had more offspring than its
competitors.
From this characterization of evolutionary function it is clear
that the evolutionary function of conscious information pro-
cessing is not necessarily something that could not also be
accomplished by non-conscious processes. As has been pointed
out previously (Dretske, 1997), the lack of alternatives is not a
requirement for evolutionary function. The function of a ﬁsh’s
ﬁns is aquatic locomotion althoughmanymammals, birds, insects,
amphibians, jellyﬁsh, and other creatures move in water without
ﬁns. This is important to point out because inquiries into the func-
tion of consciousness are often attempts to identify functions that
can only be performed consciously. However, the lack of alterna-
tives is not part of the concept of evolutionary function. It is also
not reﬂected in the common usage of the word “function.” That
one can sit on rocks, benches, and toilets does not conﬂict with the
proposal that it is the function of chairs to provide a surface to sit
on. Similarly, that the ﬁrst organism capable of conscious infor-
mation processing had an advantage over organisms without that
capability does not mean that this organism was capable of solving
problems its competitors could not solve. The more likely sce-
nario is that conscious information processing was more efﬁcient
than non-conscious information processing at solving certain
problems. Evolutionary processes optimize efﬁciency. Efﬁcient
information processing is achieved by keeping the brain as small
as possible. The metabolic rate in brain tissue is much higher than
in other tissues, because the membrane potential of neurons has
to be permanently sustained (Nieuwenhuys et al., 1998, p.11–14).
In humans, around 20% of all energy is consumed by the brain, a
ten times higher percentage than in other mammals like pigs and
horses (Mink et al., 1981). Therefore, even if the problems that
are solved in our brains by conscious information processing can
be solved in a larger brain with non-conscious information pro-
cessing, there is strong adaptive pressure to process information
consciously.
The interesting question is, what the problems are that aremore
efﬁciently solved using conscious information processing. The fact
that we still process much information non-consciously despite
having the capacity to process information consciously suggests
that conscious information processing is not simply a generally
superior way of processing information. Instead, it is likely that
different strategies are most efﬁcient for different tasks. It is not
uncommon that there is more than one information processing
strategy for solving a problem. Often a strategy for exact calcula-
tions and an alternative strategy for estimations are available. In
statistics there are for example two options to compute the p-value
of a contingency table. One option is the Fisher’s exact test and
the other is the Chi-square test. As the name suggests, the Fisher’s
exact test results in the exact p-value. The Chi-square test, in con-
trast, is an approximation. The larger the sample size, the closer to
the exact value is the Chi-square test approximation. In addition
the number of calculations required to arrive at the exact value
increases with the sample size. If one assigns a cost for calcula-
tions and a cost for potential inexactness of the p-value, then one
can calculate the less costly strategy for determining the p-value
for any sample size. For small sample sizes the Fisher’s exact test
is more efﬁcient than the Chi-square test. However, because with
increasing sample size the difference in calculation cost increases
and the approximation approaches the exact value, there is a sam-
ple size above which the Chi-square test is more efﬁcient. At very
large sample sizes, the calculation cost of the Fisher’s exact test is
prohibitive.
Now let’s imagine an evolved biological system whose ﬁtness
depends on calculating p-values of contingency tables. If there
are variants that process the information for small sample sizes
using a Fisher’s exact test and for large sample sizes using a
Chi-square test, these variants will have an evolutionary advan-
tage over variants that always use the Chi-square test as well as
over variants that always use the Fisher’s exact test. The variants
that can switch between the two computations cannot do anything
that their competitors cannot do, but they do these things more
efﬁciently. The evolutionary function of the Chi-square test per-
forming mechanism would in this scenario be to calculate p-values
for contingency tables when the sample size is large.
The methodology to identify the evolutionary function of a
biological mechanism is contrastive analysis. Contrastive anal-
ysis compares situations in which the mechanism under study
is employed to situations in which alternative mechanisms are
employed. For ﬁsh’s ﬁns, this methodology would result in
identifying aquatic locomotion as the ﬁns’ evolutionary func-
tion. Contrastive analysis requires generalizations over many
cases and because evolution is an ongoing process the correla-
tion between traits and functions is not expected to be perfect.
The fact that some animals without ﬁns are capable of aquatic
locomotion does not mean that aquatic locomotion is not the
function of ﬁns. Furthermore, aquatic locomotion is the evo-
lutionary function of ﬁns even though a contrastive analysis is
likely to uncover that sometimes ﬁns are not used for aquatic
locomotion but for walking over land, courtship displays, or
temperature regulation. It is vey common for structures or mech-
anisms that evolved for one function to be further adapted
for additional functions. The goal of contrastive analysis is
to analyze current uses to identify the phylogenetically earliest
function of a structure or mechanism. If the evidence shows
that the ﬁrst animals with ﬁns used them for aquatic locomo-
tion, then aquatic locomotion is the evolutionary function of
ﬁns.
To identify the evolutionary function of conscious informa-
tion processing, situations in which information is processed
consciously have to be compared to situations in which infor-
mation is processed non-consciously. Numerous experimental
designs have been developed for this purpose (Kim and Blake,
2005). One common strategy is to use two similar stimuli, only
one of which is processed consciously. In vision, short visual dis-
plays are often contrasted with longer displays. Another often used
paradigm is visual masking, in which a two-part stimulus that
consists of a “target” and a “mask” is differently processed from a
stimulus that consists only of the “target” (Breitmeyer, 2008). In
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olfaction, the processing of low concentrations of an odor can be
compared to the processing of higher concentrations. Unfortu-
nately, these experiments are very difﬁcult to interpret because it
is challenging to, for example, distinguish between the hypothe-
sis that an odor at low concentration is not consciously processed
and therefore cannot be named and the alternative hypothesis that
the odor is not consciously processed and also cannot be named.
For this reason, contrastive analysis of the processing of the same
physical stimulus is preferable (Kim and Blake, 2005). The most
common experimental design in which the same visual stimu-
lus is processed differently involves visual competition (Blake and
Logothetis, 2002). Examples of visual competition are ambiguous
ﬁgures and binocular rivalry (Tong et al., 2006). Another situa-
tion in which the same visual stimulus is processed in different
ways is when spatial attention is shifted (Cave and Bichot, 1999;
Chun et al., 2011). Of special interest are covert shifts of visu-
ospatial attention (as opposed to overt shifts which depend on eye
movements;Wojciulik et al., 1998). These experimental designs are
superior to those in which the processing of two different stimuli is
compared, however, they do not contrast non-conscious with con-
scious information processing. Instead, they contrast conscious
processing of one content with conscious processing of another
content. For example the duck-rabbit, an ambiguous ﬁgure that
can be perceived as a duck or as a rabbit, can be used to compare
the conscious processing of the image of a duck with the conscious
processing of the image of a rabbit.
The ideal situation for contrastive analysis is when both the
stimulus and the content are the same, but processing is conscious
in some situations and non-conscious in other situations. The
sound of a clock ticking is sometimes processed consciously and
sometimes processed non-consciously. One can become suddenly
aware of it (Block, 1997). The same is true for the feel of one’s
clothes touching the skin. These are cases in which the same stim-
ulus and the same content is sometimes processed consciously and
sometimes non-consciously.
CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE OLFACTORY SYSTEM
The olfactory system is well suited for identifying the evolutionary
function of conscious information processing because it is com-
mon that the same olfactory information is processed consciously
in some situations and non-consciously in other situations. The
olfactory system has the further advantage that it is anatomically
and computationally relatively simple (Haberly, 2001; Lledo et al.,
2005; Sela and Sobel, 2010). It has even been suggested that it rep-
resents the minimal neuroanatomy that is required for conscious
information processing (Morsella et al., 2010). There is only a sin-
gle synapse between the odor stimulus and the olfactory cortex and
the pre-cortical processing in the olfactory bulb is understood in
great detail (Shepherd et al., 2004; Hintiryan et al., 2012). Further-
more, the human olfactory system is an evolutionary conserved
structure (Eisthen, 1997) that presumably has not changed signif-
icantly since it ﬁrst evolved the capacity to process information
consciously.
Despite the relative simplicity of information processing in the
olfactory system and the evolutionary ancient neuroarchitecture
underlying it, sometimes information about our olfactory envi-
ronment is processed consciously. However, reﬂecting the relative
simplicity of our olfactory system, olfactory phenomenology is
very simple and lacks many of the complexities that hinder our
understanding of conscious perception in the visual modality
(Lycan, 2000; Köster, 2002; Stevenson, 2009a). Most prominently,
the spatial structure of olfactory phenomenology is very impov-
erished. Subjects cannot discriminate between a stimulus in the
left and right nostril (Radil and Wysocki, 1998; Frasnelli et al.,
2008) and, despite the fact that olfactory experience can have a
diachronic spatial structure, many philosophers think that olfac-
tory perception does not represent the location or direction of
olfactory stimuli (Lycan, 2000; Smith, 2002; Matthen, 2007; Pea-
cocke, 2008; Batty, 2010). The phenomenological and biological
simplicity of the human olfactory system and the fact that it is phy-
logenetically old and evolutionary conservedmake it a good system
for identifying the evolutionary function of conscious information
processing by comparing situations in which olfactory informa-
tion is processed consciously to situations in which it is not, which
is the goal of this section of the paper.
Humans mostly use their sense of smell to evaluate food, ambi-
ent air, and potential mates (Stevenson, 2009b). Often, olfactory
evaluation does not require conscious information processing.
This is reﬂected by a variety of olfactory metaphors for situations
in which we evaluate something but are not conscious of our rea-
sons for the outcome of the evaluation: “smell a rat,” “something
smells ﬁshy,” “smell test,” etc. That olfactory evaluation does not
always require information to be processed consciously has also
been demonstrated empirically. Social preferences, for example,
have been shown to be inﬂuenced by odors that were not con-
sciously processed by the subjects (Li et al., 2007). Similarly, an
odor-speciﬁc effect has been shown on judgments of participants
posing as job candidates (Cowley et al., 1977). Like evaluation of
other people, evaluation of food often does not require conscious
information processing. For example, sucrose solution is evalu-
ated to be sweeter when an undetectably small amount of ethyl
butyrate is added (Labbe et al., 2006). Similarly, odors at concen-
trations that are too low to be consciously processed can change
the perceived odor quality when added to a mixture (Guadagni
et al., 1963; Ito and Kubota, 2005). In all these cases, conscious
information processing is not required for evaluation. However,
there are also tasks in which conscious information processing is
required. If the decision that has to be made is to either swallow
or spit out a sip of wine, conscious processing is not required.
However, if the task is to write a review of the wine’s ﬂavor, it is
necessary to process the sensory information consciously.
Humans use their sense of smell predominantly for evaluation,
however, this is a recent evolutionary development. In many other
vertebrates odor-dependent navigation is the most prominent
odor-guided behavior (Jacobs, 2012). In humans, odor-guided
navigation does not play an important role, but there are still
some examples of it. Infants, for example, use olfactory cues to
orient toward their mother’s breast (Varendi et al., 1994; Varendi
and Porter, 2001). Under experimental condition, humans are
also surprisingly good at following an odor trail (Porter et al.,
2006). Navigating physical space based on olfactory cues does
usually require conscious processing of the olfactory informa-
tion. The only strategy available to locate the source of the gas
leak in a building is through serial sampling and comparisons
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 62 | 3
Keller Function of conscious information processing
[Unlike other species, humans to not have the capacity for direc-
tional smelling by comparing the olfactory input of the twonostrils
(Radil and Wysocki, 1998; Frasnelli et al., 2008; Kleemann et al.,
2009)]. To locate the gas leak, one has to sample the air by snifﬁng
while walking from room to room. Through intensity compar-
isons, the location of the gas leak can be identiﬁed (Richardson,
2011). Throughout the entire process olfactory information is pro-
cessed consciously and compared to stored conscious percepts of
the smell in the other rooms. It seems unlikely that this task could
be accomplished without conscious information processing. On
the other hand, there is evidence that odor-dependent place prefer-
ences can be mediated without conscious information processing.
It has been shown that people chose chairs in a dentist’s waiting
roomdepending on the odor the chairs were perfumedwith (Kirk-
Smith and Booth, 1980; Pause, 2004). In other studies, releasing
an odor among the slot machines on the casino-ﬂoor of the Las
Vegas Hilton increased how much was gambled in that area (pre-
sumably by increasing the time gamblers spent in the area; Hirsch,
1994). Perfuming a small pizzeria in the Brittany region of France
with lavender increased the time patrons spend in the restaurant
as well as the amount of money they spent (Guéguen and Petr,
2006). Many studies of the effect of ambient scents on behaviors
do not control for all potential biases (Teller andDennis, 2012) and
subject numbers are usually low and replications rare. Each indi-
vidual study has therefore to be interpreted with care. However,
I think that taken together there is good evidence that we prefer
to spend time in a pleasantly scented area than in an unpleasantly
scented area, and that this preference can be mediated through
non-conscious processing.
This brief overview over olfactory behaviors shows that olfac-
tory information processing has two main functions in humans:
navigation and evaluation. Contrastive analysis shows that for
both functions there are situations in which they can be accom-
plished without conscious information processing and situations
in which conscious information processing is required. We will
swallow good wine and spit out wine that has turned into vinegar
without the need to process the sensory information consciously.
On the other hand, the very same sensory information has to
be processed consciously when it is our task to write a review
about the wine. Similarly, we will pick the seat in a room fur-
thest away from an unpleasant smelling individual without the
need for conscious information processing, but locating a gas leak
requires conscious processing of the olfactory information. The
difference between situations in which conscious processing of
olfactory information is required and situations in which it is not
required is therefore a difference in the tasks the organism is facing.
Whether the sensory information has to be processed consciously
or not depends on what the information is to be used for.
The salient difference between the tasks for which conscious
information processing is required and the tasks for which it is
not required is the number of behavioral options between which
the organism has to choose to accomplish the task. In the case of
spitting out or swallowing the wine, there are two options: spitting
it out or swallowing it. In the case of writing a review about the
wine, if the reviewer has a vocabulary of 10,000 words and the
review is 100 words long, there are 6.5 × 10241 options. Similarly,
in the case of having a place preference based on an odor, there
are only two options: stay/go. However, in the case of attempt-
ing to identify the source of an odor there are as many options as
there are paths in two-dimensional space. These examples show
that the number of behavioral options increases in a combinato-
rial manner. There is a limited number of words and the task of
writing a review consists of deciding between the many possible
combinations of these words. Similarly, every navigation in space
is a combination of many stay/go/turn decisions. It is tasks that
require these combinations that require conscious information
processing.
It may seem easy to ﬁnd counterexamples that contradict this
conclusion. We sometimes process the soothing lavender odor
consciously when we are lying on the massage table in a spa and
the only behavioral option that we consider is to do nothing. How-
ever, these apparent counterexamples are based on a confusion
between evolutionary function and current use. That the crane
uses its wing to shade the water surface to better see its prey is
not in conﬂict with the proposal that the evolutionary function
of wings is ﬂight. Similarly, the current use of conscious informa-
tion processing in a wide variety of situations does not contradict
the proposal presented here. The result of the contrastive analysis
is therefore that whether olfactory information is processed con-
sciously or not depends on the task that the organism is facing.
The stimulus has to be strong enough (very low concentrations of
odors cannot be processed consciously) and the organismhas to be
in the right state (an organism in a coma cannot process informa-
tion consciously), but when these requirements are met, whether
information is or is not processed consciously depends on the task
the organism is facing. In evaluation as well as in navigation, infor-
mation is processed consciously when the organism is faced with
many different behavioral options, but non-consciously when the
choice is between few behaviors. Verbal communication and goal-
directed navigation in physical space are combinatorial taskswith a
very large number of options, which is why they require conscious
information processing.
DESCRIPTIONS OF BRAIN PROCESSES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS
OF HIERARCHY
I have developed a proposition about the function of conscious
information processing that is consistent with the facts about
consciousness in the olfactory system. The same facts are also con-
sistentwith a variety of other proposals. In this section of the paper
I will discuss two of these alternative proposals and argue that they
are not in conﬂict with the proposal presented here because they
describe the processes in the brain at a different level of hierarchy.
Biological systems are hierarchically organized. Atoms make
up molecules, which are the building blocks of cells. Cells com-
bine to functional units that are called organs, and organisms
are collections of organs. Organisms are parts of populations,
which are parts of ecosystems. The collection of all ecosystems is
the biosphere. Consequently, different processes can be described
at different levels. There are textbooks of cognitive neuroscience
and textbooks of molecular neuroscience. The topic of these text-
books is the same, but they address the topic at a different level
of description. Statements at different levels of description cannot
be in conﬂict. “Neurotransmitter release in neuron X leads to an
increase in calcium level in neuron Y,” “Neurotransmitter release
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in neuron X leads to ﬁring of neuron Y,” and “Neurotransmitter
release in neuron X leads to avoidance behavior.” are not compet-
ing hypothesis but descriptions of the same phenomenon at the
molecular, cellular, and behavioral level.
For the purpose of this paper, the processes in the brain are
described as information processing. This level of description is
one level above the cellular or neural circuit level. Information
processing in the brain is a consequence of neural activity in neu-
ral circuits that evolved for the purpose of processing information.
This is the level at whichmuch recent progress in the neurosciences
has been made. The level of description above information pro-
cessing is the level of cognitive processes. This is the level at which
much recent progress in consciousness research has been made.
There are therefore several proposals about consciousness at the
level of cognitive processes, some of which are consistent with
the data reviewed in this paper. However, these proposals are not
in conﬂict with the proposal presented here. Instead, they are
descriptions at a different level of the biological hierarchy.
One such proposal is that it is the function of higher cogni-
tive processes to guide behaviors in situations in which there are
many different behavioral options. A striking difference between
the task of either drinking a wine or not and writing a wine review
is thatwriting a review requires higher cognitive processes. Seman-
tic symbols (words) have to be combined in ways that conform to
the rules of syntax. Examples like this have lead some to believe
that syntactic thought plays an important role in consciousness
(Rolls, 2007). On the other hand, to locate an odor, physical space
has to be represented and a multi-step path through it has to
be planned. Examples like this have lead to proposals that phe-
nomenal space is necessary for consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006, p.
170). Visually representing physical space and syntactic thought
are very different cognitive processes. However, both can be con-
sidered “higher cognitive processes” and then the result of the
contrastive analysis, at the level of cognitive processes, is that
it is the function of higher cognitive processes to guide behav-
iors in situations in which there are many different behavioral
options.
Another proposal at the level of cognitive processes that follows
from the contrastive analysis presentedhere is that it is the function
of attention to guide behaviors in situations in which there are
many different behavioral options. A high level of attention is
engaged when we are asked to report about the ﬂavor of wine and
when we try to locate a gas leak. Less attention is required to detect
spoiled food one is about to swallow.
Both of these proposals, and maybe also others, are consis-
tent with the results of the contrastive analysis presented here.
However, they are descriptions of brain processes at the level of
cognitive processes, and they are not in conﬂict with propos-
als at the level of information processing like the one presented
here. Instead, these proposals raise the interesting question of
the relationship between the information processing level and the
cognitive system level. I have previously argued for a close con-
nection between attention and conscious information processing
in the olfactory system (Keller, 2011). However, this view is not
universally shared, and in visual perception cases of consciousness
in the absence of attention (van Boxtel et al., 2010) and atten-
tion in the absence of consciousness (Norman et al., 2013) have
been described. The mapping of descriptions on the informa-
tion processing level and the cognitive level therefore does not
seem to neatly respect the borders of the categories that have been
employed at the two different levels of description.
BEYOND OLFACTORY CONSCIOUSNESS
According to the proposal defended here, conscious information
processing has been selected by evolutionary processes because it
is more efﬁcient than non-conscious information processing at
solving tasks in which there are many behavioral options. It is
plausible that in situations with few potential behaviors a sim-
ple algorithm that has been shaped by innate preferences and
a combination of associative learning and generalizations is an
efﬁcient way of approaching the task. Such an algorithm would
however not be an efﬁcient way for approaching the task of writ-
ing a wine review because for this task it would be required to
associate each possible ﬂavor with one of the extremely large num-
ber of possible reviews. Instead, it may be that the most efﬁcient
way of writing a review, or of navigating toward a goal, is to
simulate the responses before executing them. According to this
theory, conscious information processing creates a simulation of
the world in which behaviors can be tried out without actually
being performed (Hesslow, 2002). A metaphor that has been used
for this type of information processing has called it a “virtual
reality arena of the mind” (Revonsuo, 2006). The metaphor of
the “virtual reality arena of the mind” is similar to the inﬂuen-
tial metaphor of the “theater of the mind” (Baars, 1988, 2005).
The key difference between a virtual reality arena and a the-
ater is that the play in the virtual reality arena is interactive.
Virtual reality arenas are computer-simulated interactive three-
dimensional environments and if thismetaphor is taken too literal,
there is the danger of interpreting it as showing that phenomenal
space is necessary for consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006, p. 170).
However, navigation in physical space is only one type of task
that has so many behavioral options that it is most efﬁciently
solved by conscious information processing. Immersion in a vir-
tual reality arena can simulate navigation in space, but it cannot
simulate writing a wine review. A better metaphor that can be
applied to all tasks that require conscious information process-
ing, not only to navigation in physical space, is “menu for action,”
which has been suggested by Prinz (2012). Conscious informa-
tion processing, according to Prinz, is, like the virtual reality
arena, a precondition for decision rather than a mechanism for
decision.
I have so far discussed only odor-guided behavior to provide
support for the proposal that it is more efﬁcient to process infor-
mation consciously (and thereby create a menu for action), when
there are many options. In situation with few options, I propose,
it is more efﬁcient to process information non-consciously. I have
argued that odor-guided behaviors are a good model system for
consciousness research. However, only a very small portion of
behaviors are odor-guided. In the last section of this paper I will
brieﬂy discuss task-dependency of conscious processing of non-
olfactory information. A comprehensive survey of non-olfactory
information processing is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
discussion of the non-olfactory cases will help clarify the proposal
presented here.
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The proposal that information is processed consciously when
an organism is faced with many behavioral options explains why
there are large differences in the frequencywithwhich information
is processed consciously between different modalities. There are
almost always enough odor molecules in the air that we inhale to
activate our olfactory system. However, we only rarely process this
information consciously. In contrast, we usually process at least
some visual information consciously. The reason for this differ-
ence between the modalities is that the behaviors that are visually
guided are usually more complex than those that are odor-guided.
Vision is the dominant sense in humans because it represents phys-
ical space more accurately than the other senses. Behaviors that
depend on precise movements in physical space, like manipula-
tion of objects and tool use, usually require choosing between
a large number of behaviors and the visual information that
guides these behaviors is therefore most efﬁciently processed con-
sciously. In contrast, as pointed out above, olfaction mostly guides
evaluative behaviors, which are usually associated with binary
decisions like stay/go, spit/swallow, inhale/hold your breath, or
approach/avoid.
Another feature of conscious information processing that is
consistent with the dependency of conscious information pro-
cessing on the number of behavioral options is that during skill
acquisition information has to be processed consciously whereas
during skill retrieval the same information can efﬁciently be pro-
cessed non-consciously (Schneider et al., 1994; Floyer-Lea and
Matthews, 2004). As someone learns to play a new song on the
guitar, they have to process their ﬁnger positions and movements
consciously. However, as they become more familiar with the
song, the ﬁnger movements can increasingly be guided by non-
conscious information processing. The reason for this change in
how the information is processed is that familiarization with the
song decreases the number of behavioral options. When a song
is played from sheets for the ﬁrst time, at every point during the
song there is a very large number of combinations of notes and
therefore ﬁnger movements that may follow. Once the song is
familiar, at every point during the song, there is only one salient
sequence of ﬁnger movements that follows. The potential behav-
iors are reduced from a very large number of combinations to
one, which results in a difference in how the information is pro-
cessed. The same reduction in the number of behavioral options
is accountable for the difference between driving a route for the
ﬁrst time and driving it for the hundredth time. When driving
a very familiar route in low trafﬁc, not much sensory infor-
mation is processed consciously. However, if suddenly a deer
jumps onto the road in front of the car, information has to be
processed consciously, because the deer makes it necessary to
consider a wide variety of possible responses to avoid a colli-
sion. These examples illustrate that the relevant number is not
the number of all possible behavioral options, but the number
of task-relevant options. When pouring liquid in one’s mouth
with the goal of reducing thirst, the task-relevant options are to
swallow it or to spit it out. Writing a review about the taste of
the liquid is also an option, but it is not task-relevant. When
a deer jumps in front of one’s car, the number of task-relevant
options suddenly increases and information is therefore processed
consciously.
CONCLUSION
A contrastive analysis of situations in which olfactory infor-
mation is processed consciously and situations in which it is
processed non-consciously suggests that information is processed
consciously only when an organism is faced with a task that
requires considering many different behaviors. This appears to
be the evolutionary function of conscious processing of olfactory
information. Although task-dependency of conscious informa-
tion processing is also widespread outside of the olfactory system,
the proposal presented here has to be tested extensively outside of
olfaction to see if it generalizes to conscious information pro-
cessing in general. Regardless of the outcome of these tests, I
hope that the analysis of the evolutionary function of conscious
information processing presented in this paper will provide an
interesting addition to the literature that is dominated by analyses
of current uses of consciousness. Neuroscience has made remark-
able progress in understanding brain processes at the level of
neuronal circuits. Consciousness research has investigated con-
sciousness mainly at the level of cognitive processes. An analysis
at the level of information processing that lies between these two
levels of hierarchy will hopefully help to bring these two ﬁelds
together.
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